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INTRODUCTION

T

axpayers in California recently found themselves the target of a
retroactive grab for revenue by the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) in
what has called an act of “lawless taxation” by the state of California.1 The
source of the conflict was the Qualified Small Business Stock credit that had
been in place in California since 1993.2 The tax credit, which was designed
* Assistant Professor of Law, Taxation, and Financial Planning, Bentley University.
B.S. Wagner College; J.D. Harvard Law School. The author is grateful for the assistance of
Jonathan Darrow and Cheryl Kirschner.
1. Lawless Taxation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2013, at 12.
2. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18152.5 (2014).
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to encourage innovation and investment in California-based enterprises,
allowed business owners who had at least eighty percent of their assets and
employees in California to take a credit of fifty percent of the capital gain
realized on a sale of their stock.3 In August 2012, the California Court of
Appeals ruled that the credit was discriminatory against out-of-state
taxpayers in violation of the Commerce Clause.4 As a result of this ruling,
the FTB made an announcement in December 2012 that it would soon be
sending tax bills to all business owners who had claimed the tax credit since
2008, seeking the taxes that would have been due plus corresponding
interest.5 The move was expected to bring an additional $120 million in
revenue to the state straight from the pockets of taxpayers who had lawfully
relied on a credit that had been in place for twenty years.6
This revenue grab by the FTB invoked the ire of taxpayers and
lawmakers alike. In response to pressure from California Governor Jerry
Brown, the FTB announced in February 2013 that it would temporarily
refrain from collecting the back taxes.7 State lawmakers, in a bipartisan
effort, immediately proposed legislation to curtail this action by the FTB.
These legislative proposals, Assembly Bill 14128 and Senate Bill 209,9 were
sent to Governor Brown on September 20, 2013 and signed into law on
October 4, 2013, ensuring that the FTB could not seek retroactive taxes along
with corresponding penalties from affected taxpayers.10
Absent action by the California state legislature in this instance, would it
have been lawful for the FTB to retroactively collect payments from
taxpayers who relied on the long-standing credit? Was this really an act of
“lawless taxation?” This Article concludes that the actions of the FTB were
in fact lawful, and indicative of a growing trend of retroactive taxing
measures that have gained acceptance in the United States in recent years,
especially as states scurry to find ways to maintain balanced budgets.
3. Id.
4. See Cutler v. Franchise Tax Bd., 208 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1261 (2012).
5. Ann Hodges, FTB Notice 2012-03, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD. (Dec. 21, 2012),
available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/notices/2012/2012_03.pdf.
6. John Tozzi, California Seeks $120 Million in Back Taxes from Small Businesses,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-0206/california-seeks-120-million-in-back-taxes-from-small-business.
7. Qualified Small Business Stock (QSBS) Gains – FAQs (Feb. 28, 2013),
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/Qualified_Small_Business_Stock_and_Cutler_Decision.shtml
(explaining the taxpayer’s right to request that the QSBS assessment be held pending
legislative action).
8. A.B. 1412 (Stats. 2013, ch. 546) (Cal. 2013).
9. S.B. 209 (Stats. 2013, ch. 546) (Cal. 2013).
10. See Sen. Ted W. Lieu, Governor Brown Signs Lieu-Backed Bill to End Retroactive Tax
on State Entrepreneurs (Oct. 4, 2013), http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-10-04-gov-brownsigns-sen-lieu-backed-bill-end-retroactive-tax-state-entrepreneurs (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
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This Article considers the extent to which the legal system condones
retroactive actions taken against taxpayers. Part I opens with a look at recent
retroactive actions in California. Part II provides an introduction to
retroactive laws. Part III then takes a closer look at the constitutionality of
retroactive actions, with an emphasis on due process concerns. Part IV
focuses that discussion specifically on retroactive tax actions, providing both
historical insight and a discussion of more recent cases.
Having
demonstrated that federal constitutional safeguards and common law have
done little in recent years to protect taxpayers from retroactive tax actions,
this Article concludes that rather than being an outlier, California is in fact
representative of a growing trend, and that neither Congress nor the judiciary
can be expected to stem the tide of retroactive revenue grabs anytime soon.
I. RETROACTIVE REACHES IN CALIFORNIA
Two California cases illustrate the extent to which the state has utilized
retroactivity as a means of limiting its potential liability to pay taxpayer
refund claims. The first case, Northwest Energetic Services v. California
Franchise Tax Board,11 considered the constitutionality of California’s LLC
fee, which imposed a levy on the total worldwide gross receipts of an LLC
even if the LLC was a nonresident business with revenue from both inside
and outside of the state.12 Constitutionally, this fee should have been limited
to the portion of gross receipts allocated to California.13 As taxpayers
commenced legal challenges against the fee in court, local legislators became
concerned about the extent of potential refund claims to which the state
would be exposed if the court were to invalidate the fee. To curb the state’s
liability, the Assembly passed Assembly Bill 1614, which was designed to
limit the refunds to which taxpayers would be entitled in the event that the
court found the gross receipts fee to be unconstitutional.14 In order to limit
possible refund claims, the legislature also made changes to the LLC fee
structure back to 2001—a six-year period of retroactivity.15 This legislation

11. 159 Cal. App. 4th 841 (2008).
12. Id. at 849–50; see also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17942 (2014).
13. Northwest, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 861–62 (“For decades, state statutes that impose taxes
on income earned outside the state's jurisdiction, or that fail to apportion total income in
accordance with the income earned within the jurisdiction, have been held to violate the
Commerce Clause.”).
14. A.B. 1614 (Stats. 1998, ch. 351) (Cal. 2013).
15. Id.
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was passed in the late hours of the last day of the legislative session16 and so
has been referred to as a “midnight special.”17
Whether such a long retroactivity period would pass constitutional
muster was never determined because Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
refused to sign the legislation into law.18 The following year, the state passed
Assembly Bill 198, which added Section 19394 to the Revenue and Taxation
Code, in part, due to concern about the outcome of the cases challenging the
calculation of the LLC fee.19 This legislation limited the amount of potential
refund claims that LLCs could file.20 Ultimately, the California Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the San Francisco trial court that the LLC
fee calculation method was unconstitutional and provided that the remedy
should be a refund of all taxes paid under the Act.21 But the FTB, relying on
the newly enacted legislation, refused to issue full refunds to the out-of-state
LLCs.22 Instead, the FTB limited the refund to the “amount by which the fee
paid plus any interest assessed exceeds the amount of the fee that would have
been assessed” pursuant to the new fee structure.23 As a result, what should
have been total refund claims of $1.3 billion has cost the state only $280
million.24
The more recent case of Gillette v. Franchise Tax Board,25 currently
pending before the California Supreme Court, also showcases the
government’s instinct to take retroactive action as a means of minimizing
state monetary obligations. California had been a member of the Multistate
Tax Compact since 1974.26 As part of this Compact, member states agree to
provide taxpayers with the option of using either the state’s own
apportionment formula for apportioning income or the three-factor of equal
weight (property, payroll, and sales) formula provided for in the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).27 In 1993, California
switched from a three-factor apportionment formula to a sales, property, and
16. Frank Russo, California Assembly Adjourns After Midnight, CAL. PROGRESS REP.
(Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/print/6635.
17. See, e.g., Kathleen K. Wright, Using Retroactive Taxes to Cure Budget Shortfalls, 61
TAX L. 1153, 1154 (2008).
18. See Peter Kanter, California's LLC Tax: Current Litigation and Retroactive
Legislation, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.mofo.com/CaliforniasLLC-Tax-Current-Litigation-and-Retroactive-Legislation/.
19. A.B. 198 (Stats. 2007, ch. 381) (Cal. 2013).
20. Id.
21. Northwest, 159 Cal App. 4th at 868.
22. See KATHLEEN K. WRIGHT, CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX MANUAL 286 (2008).
23. Id.
24. Wright, supra note 17, at 1153.
25. 209 Cal. App. 4th 938 (2012).
26. Id. at 946.
27. 3 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 38001 (2006).
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payroll factor formula that double-weighted the sales factor.28 This revised
language provided that, “Nothwithstanding Section 38006 [(the Compact)],
all business income shall be apportioned to this state by” the doubleweighted sales method.29 The FTB considered the adoption of this language
to be sufficient to negate the Compact.30 In 2010, the Gillette Company and
its subsidiaries brought legal action against the FTB, alleging that taxpayers
had the right for all periods since 1993 to continue to opt to use the
Compact’s apportionment formula because California had not withdrawn
from the Compact.31 The Court of Appeals agreed with Gillette, resulting in
the current, pending appeal to the California Supreme Court.32 In 2012,
concerned that a decision by the California high court in favor of the
taxpayers could result in significant refund claims, the California legislature
passed Senate Bill 1015 to curtail taxpayer refunds by limiting the ability of a
taxpayer to file an amended return using the Compact apportionment
formula.33 The legislation states that a taxpayer cannot elect the Compact’s
apportionment methodology on an amended return; rather, this election could
only be made on a taxpayer’s originally filed return, thus retroactively
limiting the taxpayer’s use of the Compact.34
The various retroactive reaches in California, while troubling, are not
outliers. In fact, for reasons explained in the remainder of this Article, it is
likely that such retroactive actions can withstand legal scrutiny.
II. UNDERSTANDING RETROACTIVE ACTIONS
To fully appreciate the extent to which the current trend of retroactive tax
actions pass constitutional muster, a useful starting point is a broader look at
the nature of retroactive actions and the constitutional limits of such
behavior.
A. What Is Retroactive Law?
Retroactive laws are those that “apply to prior acts, events, or
occurrences, and seek to impose new consequences on such past conduct.”35
A retroactive law “relates back to and gives a previous transaction a legal
28. Gillette, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 944.
29. Id. at 949.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 949–50.
32. Id. at 960.
33. S.B. 1015 (Stats. 2012, ch. 37) (Cal. 2012).
34. Id.
35. Andrew C. Weiler, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial Rubberstamping of
Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1076 n.27 (1993).
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effect different from that which it had under the law in effect when it
transpired.”36 In Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,37
Justice Story interpreted Article 23 of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights,
which declares that “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and
unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of
civil causes, or the punishment of offenses.”38 Justice Story explained that
the term applies not only to statutes which take effect prior to their time of
passage, but to all rules which affect vested rights and past transactions.39
B. The Natural Aversion to Retroactive Actions
There is an inherent unfairness in allowing the government to “change
the rules of the game” midstream. As early as 1788 in our nation’s history,
James Madison observed that, “The sober people of America are weary of
the fluctuating policy that has directed the public councils.”40 In short, the
people were indignant of sudden changes in the law and legislative
interferences.41 Justice Story admonished that “Retrospective laws are,
indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with
sound legislation, nor with the fundamental principles of the social
compact.”42 Even the English common law shares this aversion to
retroactivity, as recognized in an 1811 decision in which the court found that,
“It is a principle in the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that
a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective
effect.”43 A hundred years later, this notion still had broad support, as
evidenced by the following excerpt from a 1911 treatise:
Retrospective laws are . . . of questionable policy, and
contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the
conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought to deal with
future acts, and ought not to change the character of past
transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing
law.44

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

R & P Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 541 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. 1958).
22 F. Cas. 756 (N.H. 1814).
N.H. CONST. art. XXIII.
Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2 JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1398 (5th ed. 1891).
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. 1811).
HERBERT BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 24 (8th ed. 1911).
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Individuals should be able to plan their conduct in accordance with
known legal standards.45 In addition, courts have traditionally opposed
retroactive laws because they create instability and can be used either to
benefit or to harm selected classes of citizens.46 But this early indignation
began to erode and retroactive actions soon gained traction and acceptance in
the legal system. As Robert DeGaudenzi has pointed out, “Notwithstanding
this long tradition of judicial aversion for retroactive legislation, laws having
retrospective effect are regularly enacted and upheld.”47
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
While it may seem intuitive that reliance on the law should be protected,
the Constitution makes no such guarantee. “And yet nothing seems more
basic to the existence of a legal order than the ability to rely upon the actions
of others, including the government, with some assurance.”48
A. Retroactivity and the Constitution
The Constitution does not contain a blanket prohibition against all types
of retroactive actions by the government, but it does impose some
limitations. For example, government must not take any action that would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”49 The Constitution also expressly prohibits ex post facto
laws.50 The Contract Clause, which prevents laws impairing contract
obligations, states that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”51 Lastly, the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which prohibits the government taking of private property “for

45. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960).
46. Id. at 693.
47. Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Death Is Still Certain, But Are Taxes?: An Examination of the
Due Process Limitations on Retroactive Tax Legislation After Carlton v. United States, 67 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 327, 327 n.1 (1993).
48. W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive
Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216, 225 (1960).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (applicable to the federal government); id. § 10, cl. 1 (applicable to
the States).
51. Id. art. I, § 10.
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public use without just compensation,”52 has also been used to limit the
government’s taking of property rights.53
There are numerous reasons such constitutional safeguards exist. As one
commentator explained:
Citizens should be able to plan their conduct with reasonable
certainty of the legal consequences. There is a public need
for stability with respect to past transactions. Retroactive
laws may be passed with exact knowledge of who the law
will benefit or harm, which increases the potential for
corruption in the political process.54
What standard should courts apply when analyzing the constitutionality
of retroactive lawmaking? The question is not an easy one and, over time,
the manner in which it has been answered has evolved. As James Huffman
points out, one thing is clear:
If every change in the law with a negative impact for
someone were invalid because retroactive, government
would indeed cease to function. But the measure of
unconstitutional retroactivity cannot be the mere coincidence
of detriment. A more sophisticated and discerning standard
is required.55
This Article explores the limits of that standard as it has developed over time.
B. Due Process Concerns
The Due Process Clause,56 the prohibition on ex post facto laws,57 the
Takings Clause,58 and the Contracts Clause59 have all been invoked as a
52. Id. amend. V.
53. See Stewart Haskins, Gambling with the IRS: Enforcement of Retroactive Tax Statutes
in United States v. Carlton, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1163 (1996).
54. Id. at 1165.
55. James L. Huffman, Retroactivity, The Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 1095, 1116 (2000).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
57. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (applicable to the federal government); id. § 10, cl. 1 (applicable to
the States). Although the Constitution expressly forbids ex post facto laws, a 1798 U.S.
Supreme Court decision determined that this prohibition only applied to criminal, not civil,
law. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). For a more thorough treatment of ex post facto
laws, see Steve Selinger, The Case Against Civil Ex Post Facto Laws, 15 CATO J. 191 (1995).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Application of the Takings Clause requires that there first be a
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defense against retroactive government actions. As will be described more
fully in Part IV, the current leading Supreme Court case on retroactive tax
actions focuses on whether there has been a Due Process violation.60 Thus,
Part III limits its focus to Due Process concerns.
1. Early Due Process Cases
Law students and practitioners alike crave “bright-line” tests in the law.
Such tests offer exactitude and clarity. However, such bright-line tests are
few and far between. In the application of the Due Process Clause to
retroactive actions, a once bright-line aversion to retroactive government
action soon gave way to an ever-evolving balancing test that one must cobble
together from sometimes conflicting court decisions.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
ensure that the federal and state governments do not deprive any person of
“life, liberty, and property without due process of law.61 “[I]n the nineteenth
century, courts regarded retroactive legislation . . . as, by definition, failing to
provide adequate notice, and thus the ‘process’ that was ‘due.’ Neither the
strength of the government’s interest nor the scope of the regulation was
relevant.”62 For example, in an early case,63 the Court determined the
revocation of a war risk insurance contract was unconstitutional when
applied to outstanding policies.64 However, it was not long before the Court
started to move away from this approach and adopt a more lenient
acceptance of retroactivity in the area of economic legislation.
property right. In County of Mobile v. Kimble, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880), the U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged that taxation is distinct from the “taking” of property. A more recent
decision confirms this result. See Quarty v. United States, 170 F. 3d. 961 (9th Cir. 1999). For
a more thorough treatment of the Takings Clause, see Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights,
Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015 (2006).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Prior to the Great Depression, it was not uncommon for the
Supreme Court to rely on the Contracts Clause as a means of limiting state government
authority. For a more thorough treatment of this issue, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 625 (3d ed. 2006). The New Deal Era cases
changed this result. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). In
Blaisdell, the lenders argued that a Minnesota law providing an extension of time for
borrowers to repay their loans and preventing lenders from foreclosing on the property
violated the Contracts Clause by interfering with their private rights to their property. Id. at
416–17. Central to the case was the state’s argument that its action was a valid exercise of its
powers given the severe economic climate. Id. at 420. The Supreme Court upheld the actions
of the Minnesota legislature. Id. at 448.
60. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 75 (1998).
63. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
64. Id. at 583.
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2. A New Standard for Economic Legislation
The 1938 decision of the Supreme Court in Welch v. Henry65 illustrates
the increased leniency of the Court and an acceptance of retroactive actions
as long as such action was not arbitrary or oppressive. In Welch, the state of
Wisconsin adopted a tax measure in 1935 that would retroactively disallow
deductions for corporate dividends received by taxpayers as of 1933.66 In
striking down the taxpayer’s argument that such retroactive taxation violated
due process, the Court made clear that the taxpayers must bear the economic
burdens of government:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a
liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of
apportioning the cost of government among those who in
some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must
bear its burdens.67
A more recent example of the application of this standard of review in a
due process challenge to a retroactive action is Pension Benefits Guarantee
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,68 in which “the Supreme Court suggested [that]
courts that analyze legislation affecting the distribution of retirement benefits
should employ rational basis review.”69 According to the Court in PBCG,
“the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that
the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”70
This is not to suggest that retroactive application is always permissible.
As Justice O’Connor explained in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,71
Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic
legislation, including the power to affect contractual
commitments between private parties. Congress also
may impose retroactive liability to some degree,
particularly where it is “confined to short and limited
periods required by the practicalities of producing
national legislation.” Our decisions, however, have left
65. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
66. Id. at 141.
67. Id. at 146.
68. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
69. Gavin Reinke, When a Promise Isn’t a Promise: Public Employers’ Ability to Alter
Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1687 (2011).
70. PBCG, 467 U.S. at 729.
71. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
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open the possibility that legislation might be
unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability
on a limited class of parties that could not have
anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is
substantially
disproportionate
to
the
parties’
experience.72
Part IV will explore the constitutionality of retroactive actions in the tax
arena.
IV. RETROACTIVE TAXATION TAKES MANY FORMS
Despite the skepticism and distrust of legal actions with a retroactive
effect, retroactive actions in the area of taxation have a long history of
withstanding constitutional challenges. Some of the means by which
retroactive actions have been taken against often unsuspecting taxpayers
include: (1) a retroactive tax rate increase; (2) a retroactive imposition of
taxes; and (3) prospective-only application of a judicial decision declaring a
law unconstitutional.73
In most cases, the Court has upheld retroactive taxation as long as the
retroactive action was not arbitrary and the period of retroactivity was not
excessively long.74 In other cases, the Court has simply required that the
retroactive changes further a “rational legislative purpose.”75 The lowering
72. Id. at 528–29 (internal citation omitted).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 300 (1981) (per curiam)
(upholding the retroactive increase in the minimum tax rate applied to federal taxable income);
United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 501 (1937) (upholding the retroactive imposition of a
new tax on profits derived from the sale of silver); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dep’t of
Treasury, No. 289781, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 71 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2010) (upholding
the Michigan legislature’s right to retroactively amend a statute in order to prevent the
payment of refund claims that would otherwise have been due based on a previous judicial
decision).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 27 (1994).
75. See, e.g., Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1334 (2002) (emphasis added). When
Congress enacted the Roth IRA (effective January 1, 1998), it allowed taxpayers to roll their
existing IRA accounts into a Roth IRA. Id. at 1331. However, what the statute failed to do
was to include a ten percent penalty on early withdrawal from the Roth of funds transferred
from the IRA. Id. at 1331–32. When Congress discovered the error in July 1998, it enacted a
legislative fix retroactive to January 1, 1998. Id. at 1332. As a result of this new legislation,
the plaintiffs in Kitt were required to pay a ten percent withdrawal penalty on the withdrawal
from their IRA. Id. The Court explained: “[T]he validity of a retroactive tax provision under
the Due Process clause depends upon whether . . . [such application] is itself justified by a
rational legislative purpose. . . . We conclude that the retroactive application of the ten percent
additional tax to Kitt’s transaction served a rational legislative purpose and therefore is
consistent with the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1334.
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of the bar on retroactive tax actions, combined with a troubled economic
climate in which states seek to adapt as many means as possible to fund local
financial needs, has resulted in continued retroactive grabs on taxpayers’
income. As noted by one commentator:
Remedy litigation appears to be increasing today, and that
trend may be expected to continue as states toy with
applying judicial decisions on a prospective basis only,
enacting legislation that retroactively revokes a taxpayer’s
refund claims, or reversing a long-standing administrative
ruling to retroactively impose tax. Thus the questions now
being litigated include whether a state may remove the right
to a refund after a taxpayer has already paid and whether a
state may impose a tax retroactively.76
A. Retroactive Tax Rate Increases
The idea of a retroactive tax increase is not a new one. There have been
several federal retroactive tax rate increases beginning with the Revenue Act
of 1918, which retroactively increased individual and corporate rates to the
start of 1918.77 Another example is the Revenue Act of 1936, which
retroactively increased the top individual rate to seventy-nine percent from
sixty-three percent.78 This was later followed by yet another retroactive
increase from seventy-nine percent to ninety-one percent in 1944.79 When
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 was passed in August 1993, it raised
the top rates for both individuals and corporations.80 The rate increase was
subject to much criticism because Congress made the change retroactive to
January 1 of that year.81 Although lawmakers and taxpayers alike released a
firestorm of criticism at this retroactive application, such rate increases
clearly passed constitutional muster.
State legislative tax rate increases have also become increasingly
common as states use retroactive taxes to cure budget shortfalls. Table 1
shows a representative list of these increases within the past five years:

76. Gregory A. Castanias et al., Retroactivity and Refunds: Can They Really Keep Your
Money?, STATE TAX NOTES 419, 419–20 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/110816-Retroactivity-Refunds-Can-They-Really-Keep-Your-Money.pdf.
77. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
78. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648 (1936).
79. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 10, 58 Stat. 231 (1944).
80. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416.
81. Id.
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Table 1.
Retroactive Legislative Tax Rate Increases82
State

Increase83

California

0.25% increase in each tax bracket

Connecticut

Increased marginal rates from three (3%, 5%, and 6.5%) to six
(3%, 5%, 5.5%, 6%, 6.5%, and 6.75%)84

Delaware

1% increase in top income tax rate

Hawaii
Illinois
Maryland
New Jersey
New York
Oregon
Wisconsin

9% increase on income over $150,000, 10% increase on income
over $175,000, and 11% increase on income over $200,000
Staggering 67% increase in personal income tax, raising the 3%
rate to 5%
The 5%, 5.25%, and 5.5% income levels begin at lower threshold
amounts, and a new 5.75% tax bracket has been added
Temporary tax increase of 8% on incomes over $400,000, 10.25%
on incomes over $500,000, and 10.75% on income over
$1,000,000
Temporary increase of 8.97% on incomes over $500,000 and
7.85% on income over $200,000
Temporary increase of 11% on incomes over $250,000 and 10.8%
on incomes over $125,000
New 7.75% increase on incomes over $225,000

On Election Day 2012, California joined this group of states when voters
approved Proposition 30 and increased taxes retroactively to January 1,
2012.85 Taxpayers are approving retroactive taxes at the ballot box.
B. Retroactive Imposition of Taxes: Wholly New Tax v. Clarification?
The preliminary hurdle in analyzing the constitutionality of retroactively
imposing a tax is determining whether the action represents the imposition of
a “new tax law,” in which case the ability to take retroactive action may be
more limited, or whether such action merely represents a legislative
82. All data contained herein has been derived from Kail Padgitt & Mark Robyn, Some
States Respond to Budget Shortfalls with Tax Increases, TAX FOUND. (July 2009),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/some-states-respond-budget-shortfalls-tax-increases.
83. In the interest of simplicity, the only rate increases incuded here are those applicable to
single filers.
84. Rute Pinho, Retroactive Income Tax Increases, OLR RES. REP. (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0021.htm.
85. Ashlea Ebeling, California Voters Sock it to the Rich (and the Fate of Other State Tax
Ballot Measures), FORBES (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ashleaebeling/2012/11/08/california-voters-sock-it-to-the-rich-and-the-fate-of-other-state-taxballot-measures/.
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clarification of existing law, in which case the legislature is given wide
latitude to retroactively issue a clarification of legislative intent.86
Distinguishing between the two is not without controversy. “There is, to be
sure, a gray area between cases that have clearly approved two years of tax
retroactivity and cases that have barely struck down decades of non-tax
retroactivity.”87
1. Historical Development
As early as 1874, the Supreme Court in Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance
Co.88 upheld a retroactive tax on corporations on dividends declared.89 This
tax was enacted in 1870, but applied to earnings accrued in 1869.90
Taxpayers challenged the tax on the ground that its retroactive application
violated their rights to due process.91 In striking down the due process
challenge to the tax, the Court explained:
The right of Congress to have imposed this tax by a new
statute, although the measure of it was governed by the
income of the past year, cannot be doubted; much less can
it be doubted that it could impose such a tax on the income
of the current year, though part of that year had elapsed
when the statute was passed.92
Then, for a brief period in the early 1900s, the Court struck down the
retroactive application of the newly enacted gift taxes as a violation of due
process, finding that the taxpayer's lack of notice as to future new tax laws
would make the application of those laws “arbitrary and capricious.”93
Nichols v. Coolidge94 involved the application of section 402(c) of a Revenue
Act passed on February 24, 1919.95 This Act required the estate of Mrs. Julia
Coolidge to include the gross value of property that the decedent had already
transferred to her children several years before her death because the actual
86. ERIKA LUNDER ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R42791, CONSTITUTIONALITY
RETROACTIVE TAX LEGISLATION 4 (2012).
87. James M. Puckett, Embracing the Queen of Hearts: Deference to Retroactive Tax
Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 349, 383 (2013).
88. 87 U.S. 323 (1873).
89. Id. at 333.
90. Id. at 326.
91. Id. at 328.
92. Id. at 331.
93. See Haskins, supra note 53, at 1165.
94. 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
95. Id. at 532.
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conveyance of the property did not occur until her death in January 1921.96
According to the Court, the retroactive application of the tax was “arbitrary,
capricious[,] and amount[ed] to confiscation”97 in violation of the Due
Process Clause. Of particular significance in this case was the fact that this
was considered a wholly new tax.98
In Blodgett v. Holden,99 the plaintiff transferred inter vivos gifts valued at
$850,000 in January 1924 before the June 2 passage of the Estate Tax as
section 319 of the Revenue Act of 1924.100 The record in the case indicated
that the gift tax provisions did not come before Congress for consideration
until February 25 of that year, so there was no notice to the taxpayer that
imposition of the gift tax could be imminent.101 The Court therefore found
the retroactive imposition of the gift tax to be arbitrary and invalid.102
The facts of Untermyer v. Anderson103 are similar to those of Blodgett
except that Untermyer’s gifts were made on May 23, 1924, only very shortly
before the bill at issue was signed into law.104 The Court focused on whether
the fact that Untermyer had notice of the pending enactment of the gift tax
was sufficient to distinguish the case from Blodgett and allow the taxation to
stand.105 Finding that it did not, the Court ruled that the application of the tax
to Untermyer’s gifts was an arbitrary action in violation of due process since
Untermyer, at the time of the gift, did not have notice that the transaction
would be subject to tax.106 Blodgett and Untermyer both advance the
“wholly new tax” argument, and illustrate the Supreme Court’s agreement
that “imposition of the tax retroactively would be unreasonable considering
that the taxpayers had no notice when the gifts where [sic] made that they
may be subject to tax in the future.”107 By the 1930s, the Court began to shift
away from the requirement of actual notice for taxpayers and instead focused
on whether the retroactive application of legislation was harsh or
oppressive.108

96. Id. at 533.
97. Id. at 543.
98. Id. at 540–41.
99. 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
100. Id. at 146.
101. Id. at 146–47.
102. Id. at 147.
103. 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
104. Id. at 444–45.
105. Id. at 445.
106. Id. at 444–45.
107. The Likelihood and Enforceability of a Retroactive Tax, ASSET PROT. SOC’Y (2002),
http://www.assetprotectionsociety.org/the-likelihood-and-enforceability-of-a-retroactive-tax-2/
(last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
108. See Haskins, supra note 53, at 1166.
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In 1931, the Court decided the case of Milliken v. United States.109
There, the Court sanctioned the retroactive taxation of a decedent’s gifts—
which he had made in contemplation of death in 1916—at the increased rate
that had gone into effect in 1918.110 The Court found that this situation did
not represent the imposition of a wholly new tax as it had in the earlier cases,
and therefore the taxpayer was not without notice.111 In analyzing the
Court’s various approaches in these early estate tax cases, Ralph Neuhoff
sees the common element in the decisions to be one of fairness, in that the
Court will only permit retroactive application when a taxpayer could have
reasonably foreseen such an outcome.112
2. The Carlton Standard
The most recent Supreme Court case on retroactive tax legislation is
United States v. Carlton,113 decided by the Court in 1994. At issue in that
case was an estate tax deduction permitted by Internal Revenue Code section
2057.114 This deduction, which went into effect in October 1986, allowed an
estate to deduct one-half of the sale price of employer securities that the
estate sold to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).115 In reliance on
this provision, Carlton, acting as executor of the estate of Willametta Day,
purchased 1.5 million shares of MCI Communications Corporation stock for
$11,206,000.116 Two days later, Carlton resold this stock to the MCI ESOP
for $10,575,000, resulting in a loss of $631,000.117 Carlton then took the
deduction for one-half of the sales price ($5,287,000) on the estate return.118
In January 1987, the IRS announced that it would only allow such a
deduction for stock that was owned by a decedent before his or her death
and, therefore, denied the claimed deduction for the Day estate.119 In
December 1987, Congress enacted legislation supporting the IRS’s
conclusion that such a deduction would only be available for stock owned by
a decedent before death.120 Carlton paid the deficiency plus interest and then
109. 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
110. Id. at 18–19.
111. Id. at 23.
112. See Ralph Neuhoff, Retrospective Tax Laws, 21 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 1 (1935).
113. 512 U.S. 26.
114. Id. at 28.
115. Id. at 31.
116. Id. at 28.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29.
120. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10411(a), 101 Stat. 1330-432. The
statute (as amended) provided that, to qualify for the estate tax deduction, the securities sold to
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filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
claiming that the retroactive applications of the 1987 amendments to Code
section 2057 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.121
The District Court disagreed and awarded summary judgment to the United
States.122 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the District Court.123 The majority considered two major factors in
reaching its decision: (1) whether the taxpayer relied on prior law to his
detriment; and (2) whether the taxpayer had actual or constructive notice of
the change.124
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit.125
While acknowledging that Carlton relied on the version of Code section 2057
in place at the time of the transaction, the Court did not find this persuasive,
reiterating instead Justice Stone’s ruling in Welch v. Henry that “Tax
legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal
Revenue Code.”126 Further, the Court did not find Carlton’s lack of notice
dispositive, citing to its decision in Milliken that a taxpayer “should be
regarded as taking his chances of any increase in the tax burden which might
result from carrying out the established policy of taxation.”127 The Court
instead found the following factors compelling: (1) the purpose of the
retroactive amendment was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary; and (2)
Congress acted promptly and therefore the retroactivity period was
modest.128 In this situation, Congress anticipated that without amendment,
the loophole provided by Code section 2057 could cause a revenue loss of as
much as $7 billion, which was twenty times greater than expected.129 Once
Congress learned of the problem caused by the statutory language of 2057, it
acted promptly to correct the statute and this retroactive application was a
modest period of only slightly over one year.130 The Court cited to its
holding in United States v. Darusmont,131 stating:
an ESOP must have been “directly owned” by the decedent “immediately before death.” Id.
121. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 29–30.
125. Id. at 30, 35.
126. Id. at 33; Welch, 305 U.S. at 146–47 (“Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the
taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost
of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must
bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition
does not necessarily infringe due process . . . .”).
127. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34; Milliken, 283 U.S. at 23.
128. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 32–33.
131. 449 U.S. 292.
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Congress “almost without exception” has given general
revenue statutes effective dates prior to the dates of actual
enactment.
This “customary congressional practice”
generally has been “confined to short and limited periods
required by the practicalities of producing national
legislation.”132
In separate concurrences, Justice O’Connor and Justices Scalia and
Thomas offered additional insights. Justice O’Connor reiterated the due
process standard—“legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational
means”133 —while stressing that Congress has not been granted unlimited
power to upset otherwise settled expectations.134 In her view, “A period of
retroactivity longer than the year preceding the legislative session in which
the law was enacted would raise . . . serious constitutional questions.”135
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the Court’s judgment only on the
basis that they did not find “substantive due process” to be a constitutional
right.136 According to the Justices, if they did believe that such a right
existed, they would dissent from the opinion, believing the amendment to be
more than a curative measure, referring to it instead as “bait-and-switch
taxation.”137
3. Post-Carlton Development
In September 2012, the Supreme Court of New York upheld legislation
enacted in 2010 to modify the tax rules for a non-resident S Corporation
shareholder making a section 338(h)(10) election.138 Essentially, New York
wanted to ensure that non-residents would be subject to New York tax on the
deemed sale of their assets.139 The most striking feature of the retroactive
legislation was the effective date. Enacted in 2010, it was effective
retroactively to January 1, 2007.140 The taxpayer at issue in the dispute

132. Id. at 296–97; Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32–33.
133. 512 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 37.
135. Id. at 38.
136. Id. at 39 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring).
137. Id.
138. See Caprio v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 955 N.Y.S. 2d 734, 747
(2012). The purpose of making such an election is to treat a stock purchase as an asset
purchase for taxation purposes.
139. Id. at 740. Existing legislation as interpreted by court decisions did not subject this
transaction to tax for a non-New York resident.
140. Id.
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challenged the constitutionality of the retroactivity in court.141 Relying on
both federal and New York cases that have permitted retroactive legislation,
the court upheld the tax, finding that a retroactive tax should be upheld
“unless it reaches so far into the past or so unfairly as to constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.”142 Also expressing concern
with whether the retroactive legislation was harsh and oppressive, the court
noted that this is a “question of degree, requiring a balancing of the
equities.”143
4. Administrative Retroactive Changes
Another aspect of this discussion is to what extent agencies, such as the
Internal Revenue Service, have authority to engage in retroactive rulemaking.
As pointed out by Chris Schmitter, administrative authority has become
increasingly important, especially given the increasing amount of pressure on
agencies to address the administrative aspects of new laws, such as the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street reform bill.144 One thing is clear: if the agency is engaged in
rulemaking, its ability to do so retroactively is limited.145 If, instead, the
retroactive rules are merely interpretive, they are more likely to pass muster,
since interpretive rules are designed to clarify what the law has always
meant, not establish new rules.146 One approach taken by the IRS in recent
years has been especially troubling. In a number of cases, the IRS has taken
the position that it has administrative authority to invalidate decided cases
through retroactive interpretive regulations.147 These actions give “further
141. Id. at 742.
142. Id. at 743.
143. Id. (internal citations omitted).
144. Chris Schmitter, Going Back in Time: The Search for Retroactive Rulemaking Power
in Statutory Deadlines, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1114, 1115 (2013).
145. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Weien, Note, Retroactive Rulemaking, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 749, 756–57 (2007) (discussing the tendency of courts to cite the principle of fair notice
as a reason for barring retroactive rulemaking). For a thorough treatment of an agency’s
ability to engage in retroactive rulemaking when the agency is given a specific deadline by
Congress in which to act and fails to meet that deadline, see generally Schmitter, supra note
144.
146. See, e.g., Puckett, supra note 87, at 367.
147. See, e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 10-1204, 2012 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11811 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2012). In Intermountain, the D.C. Circuit found that
the IRS had the ability to issue regulations that interpreted the law in such a way that the
regulations effectively overruled a recent decision by the Tax Court on the contested Code
provisions. At issue was whether an overstatement of basis was an omission of income under
Code sections 6501(e) and 6229 for purposes of extending the normal three-year statute of
limitations to six years. On September 1, 2009, the Tax Court ruled that it was not. On
September 28 of that same year, the IRS issued two temporary interpretive regulations that
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credence to claims that the agency and the Treasury Department . . . are
pushing the boundaries of their regulatory powers to an extent never before
seen.”148 For the time being, however, that position has been unable to
advance. In April 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that IRS regulations will
not be given deference in situations in which the Court has already decided
that Congressional intent is clear and there is no ambiguity for the
regulations to resolve.149
C. Application of a Statute That Has Been Declared Unconstitutional
Taxing measures that run afoul of constitutional limitations, and are
struck down on judicial challenge, bring up the question of what remedies are
available to taxpayers who have paid an unconstitutional tax. Answering this
question necessitates a determination of whether the decision will be applied
prospectively or retroactively. Retroactive application is the general rule and
would allow those who had been required to pay an unconstitutional tax a
right to a refund of such taxes.150 However, recognizing that such application
could leave states financially vulnerable and that numerous refund claims
could detrimentally affect a state’s financial stability, courts have allowed the
states flexibility in crafting taxpayer relief. As the Court in McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco made clear, there are a variety
of approaches available to the taxing authority, and while a state must
provide a taxpayer with meaningful relief, a state may consider the impact of
any refunds on state financial stability:
We agree that, within our due process jurisprudence, state
interests traditionally have played, and may play, some role
in shaping the contours of the relief that the state must
provide to illegally or erroneously deprived taxpayers . . . .
States have a legitimate interest in sound fiscal planning and
. . . this interest is sufficiently weighty to allow States to
withhold predeprivation relief for allegedly unlawful tax
assessments, providing postdeprivation relief only.151

said that this would be an omission of gross income. Relying on Code section 7805(b), which
gives the IRS authority to issue regulations with retroactive effect, the IRS imposed the
regulations retroactively.
148. Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretive Treasury Regulations,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558, 1559 (2011).
149. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012).
150. McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (2011).
151. Id. at 50.
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In addition to the California cases described in Part I, in a series of recent
cases in other states, state legislatures have taken retroactive actions either to
eliminate or to diminish pending taxpayer refund claims. In most of these
cases, Supreme Court review was requested and certiorari was denied.
In Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp.,152 the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky considered whether the due process clause was violated when state
legislation was retroactively applied to taxpayer refund claims to deny
taxpayer’s interest on pending claims.153 In that case, the taxpayer
corporations filed tax returns in Kentucky, which were later amended seeking
a refund of an overpayment along with corresponding interest.154 While the
refund claims were pending, the Kentucky legislature passed retroactive
legislation that potentially shortened the period for which a taxpayer could
accrue interest on overpayments and also decreased the rate of that
interest.155 The taxpayer argued that such action violated due process, but the
court found that it did not because it furthered a legitimate governmental
purpose of raising revenue in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Carlton.156 The taxpayers sought Supreme Court review, but this was
denied.157
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Department of Treasury158 involved actions of
the Michigan legislature that retroactively amended the meaning of the term
“persons.”159 This amendment resulted in a denial of pending refund claims
filed by the Ford Motor Company seeking a refund resulting from a bad debt
deduction.160 The Court of Appeals of Michigan ruled that the retroactive
action of the legislature was a clarification of legislative intent.161 According
to the court, “Once the intention of the legislature is discovered, it prevails
over any conflicting rule of statutory construction.”162 The Supreme Court
also denied certiorari in this case.163
The center of the dispute in Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc.164 was the
ability of corporations to file consolidated returns under the unitary business
152. Nos. 2007-CA-002549-MR & 2008-CA-000023-MR, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 229 (Ky.
App. Nov. 20, 2009).
153. Id. at *20.
154. Id. at *3–4.
155. Id. at *19.
156. Id. at *21.
157. Id., cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1720 (2011).
158. 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 5088.
159. Brief for Respondent at 5, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 131 S. Ct. 1000
(2011) (No. 10-481).
160. Id. at 5–6.
161. Ford, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 71, at *1–2.
162. Id.
163. Id., cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1000 (2011).
164. 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009).
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principle.165 The corporate taxpayers in that case had originally filed
separate returns, but a 1994 ruling by the Supreme Court of Kentucky
authorized consolidated return filings for unitary businesses.166 As a result of
that ruling, taxpayers filed amended consolidated returns seeking a refund of
overpaid tax.167 Recognizing that the court’s ruling would result in a barrage
of amended consolidated return filings seeking a refund, the Kentucky
legislature retroactively modified the statute to bar the filing of this type of
consolidated return and also to bar the payment of any refunds due on this
type of amended return.168 The court upheld the retroactive amendments
made in 1996 and 2000 as an exercise of the state’s revenue-raising function
that served a legitimate government purpose.169 The lone dissent in the case
had this to say:
This corporate tax case presents a rather straightforward
question: how aggressively may the General Assembly
legislate after-the-fact in an effort to retain tax monies which
this court has held were collected in contravention of state
law? . . . Generally, a sovereign must provide “meaningful
relief” in the form of a refund of the invalidly collected taxes
and, while there is some latitude to legislate tax law
retroactively, that power must be exercised promptly for a
legitimate purpose and for a modest period. The 2000
Kentucky General Assembly exceeded the bounds of due
process when it passed H.B. 541 in an effort to undo entirely
this Court’s ruling over five years earlier . . . . Neither the
complete ban of all outstanding tax refund claims associated
with the . . . case nor the retroactive rewrite of state tax law
to condone the retention of corporate taxes invalidly
collected five to twelve years previously passes
constitutional muster.170
The Supreme Court once again denied certiorari.171

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Miller, 296 S.W.3d at 407 (Abramson, J., dissenting).
Id., cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010).
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A more recent case to note is General Motors Corp. v. Department of the
Treasury,172 in which the court gave Michigan wide latitude to enact
retroactive legislation that denied the taxpayer a refund of overpaid taxes.173
The Michigan Department of Treasury required General Motors (GM) to pay
use taxes on vehicles that it purchased for its employees to use as
demonstration vehicles.174 GM paid such taxes for many years, until a
decision by the Michigan Supreme Court175 determined that cars purchased
as demos were exempt from the use tax under the sale for resale
exemption.176 While that case was pending, GM filed a refund claim, in
August 2006, seeking a refund of approximately $65 million for the period of
1996 through March 2002.177 The court issued its decision in May 2007.178
In September 2007, GM filed a second refund claim seeking approximately
$51 million for the period of March 2002 though August 2007.179 In the
interim, the state was concerned by estimates that the court’s decision carried
a potential one time cost to the state of $250 million and ongoing costs of
$29.2 million.180 In June 2007, Michigan state lawmakers introduced House
Bill 4882 into law, which retroactively modified the use tax law to clarify
that purchases of demo vehicles such as those paid by GM would remain
subject to taxation.181 This proposed legislation became law in October 2007
and the legislature decreed that it would have retroactive effect dating back
five years to 2002 and beyond to the extent a statute of limitations period
remained open for a taxpayer.182 In effect, the legislation retroactively
prohibited GM’s refund claims. The Appeals Court of Michigan, relying
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carlton, determined that this
action by the Michigan legislature did not violate GM’s due process rights.183
The court explained:
A legislature’s action to mend a leak in the public treasury or
tax revenue—whether created by poor drafting of legislation
in the first instance or by a judicial decision—with
retroactive legislation has almost universally been
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

803 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 719–20.
Id. at 703.
Betten Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 478 Mich. 864 (2007).
Id.
GMC, 803 N.W.2d at 703.
Betten, 478 Mich. at 864.
GMC, 803 N.W.2d at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 707–08.
Id. at 712.
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recognized as “rationally related to a legitimate legislative
purpose.”184
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case in 2012, allowing the state
court’s approval of a five-year retroactivity period to stand.185
Commenting on the ability of state legislatures to pass legislation to
make clarifications to the law as a result of an unfavorable judicial outcome,
Robert Gunning has observed:
If the legislative branch believes that the taxpayers may
succeed and open the doors to refund claims for other
taxpayers, it should act promptly to rectify any perceived
defects in the legislation, rather than await the result of the
litigation and then attempt to retroactively slam the door on
taxpayer refund claims.186
The Supreme Court’s repeated refusal to grant certiorari in cases challenging
state retroactive takings will no doubt help to perpetuate the ever-lengthening
periods of retroactive takings.
CONCLUSION
“The Great Recession that began in December 2007 has made for
difficult times for American state and local governments, as with most all
entities and individuals.”187 The landscape of retroactive revenue grabs is
vast and no doubt fueled, in part, by state financial needs. In the absence of
an express constitutional provision prohibiting retroactive actions, the
question remains whether there are any limits on the extent to which
taxpayers can be expected to incur retroactive costs. Supreme Court
decisions on retroactive actions go back almost as far as the start of our
nation’s history, and yet provide no sense of clarity that will help taxpayers
to plan for or guard against a retroactive taking. The Supreme Court has
consistently broadened its acceptance of retroactive actions in the area of
taxation. Although early cases sometimes looked to whether taxpayers had
adequate notice of a change or whether the retroactivity period was short
184. Id. at 710; Carlton, 521 U.S. at 35.
185. GMC, 803 N.W.2d 698, cert. denied 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1004 (2012).
186. Robert R. Gunning, Back from the Dead: The Resurgence of Due Process Challenges
to Retroactive Tax Legislation, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 329 (2009).
187. John L. Mikesell & Daniel R. Mullins, State and Local Revenue Yield and Stability in
Great Recession: The Virtues of Cyclical Versus Secular Adequacy and the Necessity of Policy
Responses, 102 ANN. CONF. OF TAX’N, NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 246 (2009).
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(generally within one year), this approach has gradually given way to a more
lenient standard. The driving factor in recent cases tends to be the Carlton
Court’s rational basis standard, a low standard of judicial scrutiny.188 The
generally accepted one-year standard has given way to cases that condone
two-, three-, and even five-year retroactivity periods, although no bright line
test has emerged. The United States Supreme Court seems content to sit on
the sidelines as due process rights are increasingly stripped away.
At present there remains no litmus test for assessing the constitutionality
of a retroactive revenue grab. “There is much play in the joints between two
years’ retroactivity and two decades’ retroactivity that the Court’s precedents
do not squarely address. [As] Justice Scalia observes, . . . the reasoning the
court applies [in Carlton] to uphold the statute in this case guarantees thatall
[sic] retroactive laws will henceforth be valid.”189 While this is certainly an
exaggeration by Justice Scalia, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court’s
adoption of the rational basis standard of review in such cases and the
Court’s failure to clearly define a “modest period of retroactivity”190
inevitably leads to the conclusion that for taxpayers facing retroactive
changes that result in additional tax liabilities or the denial of refund claims,
relief is nowhere in sight. California’s “lawless taxation” and “midnight
special” are only a glimpse of what is yet to come.

188. See LUNDER ET AL., supra note 86, at 1–2.
189. Puckett, supra note 87, at 378.
190. Carlton, 521 U.S. at 32.

